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Land Use Control Policies and Population
Distribution in America
By M. G. WOODROOF 1I*
P OPULATION has recently emerged as one of the most controversial
subjects on the American scene. As always in such cases of notable
passing interests, the law and its ramifications in the areas of popula-
tion control and distribution are becoming the subjects of close scru-
tiny. Governmental regulation of the areas of sexual behavior (pre-
sumably related to population generation), the dissemination of various
forms of birth control information, and the highly emotional issue of
abortion, has traditionally been pervasive, but subject to little public
discussion. The modem controversies in these areas stem from the
relaxation of traditional restrictions in some areas and the imposition
of new restrictions in others.
Undoubtedly the present controversy regarding these areas of the
law is a functional part of the general syndrome of controversy which
has become endemic to our modem society. In the early 1950's, it was
the international communist conspiracy; in the late 50's and early 60's,
it was Sputnik and the missile gap; in the late 60's, it was law and
order and campus unrest. Each of those problem areas was at the time
designated as a threat likely to destroy our society. Each of them in
fact engendered changes in our legal and societal structure, and in
our life styles; after adjusting to the changes, however, we moved on
to new considerations.
Viewed within this context, population control is one facet of the
recently recognized social problem of the deterioration of our quality
of life. Other controversies, similar to population control, which exist
as facets of this general social problem are those surrounding the fields
* A.B., 1961, J.D., 1968, University of Kentucky; LL.M., 1969, Washington
University. Visiting Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; Associate Professor of
Law, Drake University.
[14271
of environmental law and protection, consumerism, and certain sub-
currents of the civil rights movement.
Recognition of the place of population control within this larger
context enables us to achieve insights into the problem which would
not likely be achieved through the less disciplined popular approach.
One of the insights achieved through this contextual and analytical
view of the population problem is that in regard to the quality of life,
at least, the population problem at this time is not so much overpop-
ulation itself, as it is a maldistribution of population. This maldistri-
bution has caused dire consequences of an internatonal scale;1 while
potentially productive lands in some parts of the world lie fallow, other
parts of the world (e.g., India) tragically fail to support population in
excess of that justified by the area's productivity potential. Maldistri-
bution of population within the United States has not yet reaped
such tragic fruit, but it has played a part in creating the decline in
the quality of life-a problem in itself with serious potential conse-
quences.
Population maldistribution is both a quantitative and qualitative
phenomenon. Quantitatively, the increased and increasing density of
population in our nation's urban centers has profoundly affected our
way of life. No one would suggest that no variations in population
density should exist from area to area; such an even distribution of
population would frustrate alike the desires of those seeking a rural
existence and those seeking an urban existence. Nevertheless, many
metropolitan areas are overcrowded, and attempts to mitigate the ef-
fects of this quantitative maldistribution of population have led to
qualitative problems.
As the result of legal tools-especially zoning-which were de-
signed and implemented to create distinct urban and rural amenities
within the expanding urban environment, large segments of the urban
population have been shunted aside. With life styles and resources
adapted neither to the traditional city dweller sophistication nor to the
newly created suburban quasi-rural gentry, blacks, the poor, and other
members of minority groups have frequently been forced into a geo-
graphical subculture-not of their making, not responsive to their
needs, and in sharp contrast to the professed values of our society.
Thus, the quantitative and qualitative aspects of population maldis-
1. See generally P. & A. EHRLICH, POPULATION, REsouRcEs, ENVIRONMENT
(1970).
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tribution are so closely interrelated that the entire problem may be
discussed generically. Measures which affect either or both of these
aspects must be evaluated individually in order to predict their effect
upon the results of population distribution within our culture.
One of the causes of population maldistribution within the United
States has been the operation of certain of our laws. An examination
of those laws, with a view towards present and potential efforts to
overcome these untoward population distributing effects, serves as the
focus of this article.
Nonlegal Factors Affecting Population Distribution
The effect of various laws is but one of the many factors affecting
population distribution within our country. Indeed, it is unlikely that
most individuals would recognize that the operation of law has any
discernable effect upon population trends. The most important factors
which people feel induce them to locate in one place rather than another
are "convenience," "economic necessity" and "generally more agreeable
surroundings."' 2  Undoubtedly, the most important of these, measured
in terms of effect upon mass population movements throughout our
history, is economic necessity. Population migration has generally con-
sisted of movement from areas of recognizably low or diminishing eco-
nomic opportunity to other growing areas of higher or increasing oppor-
tunity.3 Recent population migrations include the widespread migra-
tion of rural residents to new and growing urban areas as a result of
the declining agricultural opportunity accompanying increasing farm
mechanization. 4 A similar motivation-the expectation of greater job
opportunities in northern urban areas-has lead to a widespread migra-
tion of blacks from the south to the north in recent years.5
Distribution of population within metropolitan areas has similarly
been rooted largely in economic considerations. But also significant
2. Ehrlich & Holdren, Why Do People Move?, SATURDAY Rnv., Sept. 5, 1970,
at 51.
3. C. & I. TAEUBER, THE CHANGING POPULATION OF THE UNrrED STATES 100
(1958). A number of specific examples of economically induced population migrations
come to mind. The western expansion of our nation in the years prior to 1900 was an-
obvious manifestation of this trend, with the accompanying "Oklahoma land rushes,"
"range wars," and other economic problems. The migration of midwesterners fleeing
"the dust bowl" to California in the 1930's, as well as their rejection in their new
home, were direct results of the economic desperation of the times. See J. STmnEcK,
Tim GRAPES OF WRATH (1939).
4. TAEuBER, supra note 3, at 107, 120.
5. Id. at 110.
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in metroplitan areas have been the less precise, but nonetheless im-
portant, considerations of convenience and agreeability of surround-
ings. The traditional American life style has always placed a great
demand upon personal privacy, and those families within metropolitan
areas who have been economically successful have demanded fewer
persons per room, and a greater distance between neighbors. 6 This
demand has been met by migration to the city's suburbs and has oc-
curred partly because of economic considerations. 7
Such population migrations to the suburbs feed upon them-
selves in such a way as to increase the degree of the migration. The
presence of larger populations in the suburbs, for example, makes feas-
ible the expansion of services, such as electric power, water systems,
fire and police protection, sewers, transportation, and communication.
These increased services make the suburbs even more appealing to
potential migrators. At the same time, the demand for a large number
of customers for these services is such that migration will be encour-
aged by the business interests involved in providing these services.'
The same business effects of population migration to the suburbs
operate upon merchants. Retail trade establishments tend to follow
their markets to the peripheral areas of the city. Once again, the loca-
tion of these retail trade establishments in the suburbs creates em-
ployment in the suburbs and brings the potential employment close
to suburban residents to fulfill the great demand for employment which
might otherwise exist. A number of other considerations, unrelated
or only indirectly related to economic considerations, have also influ-
enced the flight to the suburbs. The development of the automobile
has been important in providing a mechanism for individuals to ex-
6. D. BoGUE, METROPOLITAN GROWTH AND THE CONVERSION OF LAND TO
NONAGRICULTURAL USES (Scripps Foundation Studies in Population Distribution No. 11,
1956).
7. The cost of land in suburbs, for example, was traditionally lower than that in
the city, so that the presumably more agreeable surroundings inherent in "more space
per person" were economically feasible to a greater degree in the suburb than within the
city. This differential in land cost has diminished recently, but still exists to some
degree on a comparative level. Bogue, What We Need to Know About Decentralization
and the Growth of the Suburbs, in NEEDED URBAN AND METROPOLITAN RESEARCH 38, 40
(Scripps Foundation Study in Population Distribution No. 7) (1953). Even at the
lower prices found outside the city, the purchase of land for a suburban residence
would normally be beyond the economic means of most potential buyers. Expansion
of credit availability, however, has made it possible for more people to buy their own
homes in the suburbs. Hogt, The Changing Principles of Land Economics 11 (Urban
Land Institute Technical Bulletin # 60, 1968).
8. Bogue, supra note 7, at 39.
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tend the distance which they could feasibly interpose between their
residence and their work, schools, shops, and other centers of activ-
ity.9 In addition, considerations of national defense have oftentimes
induced certain industries to transfer their activities from the city core
to the peripheral areas, again creating additional suburban employment
opportunities.10
Population distribution has also often been affected by the en-
demic operational pattern of the city. There are a number of city func-
tions that are carried out in response to values common throughout the
population and centered within the city's deteriorating areas. These
functions are prized-not banned-as part of the urban structure and
are normally bound together and located in particular areas of the
city in order that the entire population might have access to them.
"Red light" districts and concentrations of gambling activity, for ex-
ample, are important parts of a city's functional organization. The
presence of these functions in the city is necessary but at the same
time makes the city an unpleasant place to live." Accordingly, the
ideal is to move to an area close enough so that such services are avail-
able, but not so close that they will intrude themselves upon one's
everyday life.
Other nonlegal factors which have affected population migration
within metropolitan areas are the comparative quality of schools, the
effect of weather (particularly pollution), the additional financial op-
portunities created by social security, the location of resources within
the area to be exploited, and the social and cultural opportunities
sought by potential migrators. Documentation of such factors will be
foregone in this article, however, in favor of a detailed examination of
the effect of legal factors upon population distribution.
Legal Factors Indirectly Affecting Population Distribution
There are a number of legal factors that affect population distri-
bution. Among those which have recently been receiving attention are
the various laws regarding welfare rights and indigency. An early,
direct legislative approach to the indigency problem provided that it
was unlawful to knowingly bring or assist in bringing indigent persons
into the jurisdiction. A California statute of this type was found to be
9. Id. at 89, 40.
10. BoaUE, supra note 6.
11. Lohman, Knowledge Needed for Redevelopment and the Control of Slums
and Blighted Areas, in NEEDED URBAN AND METRoPOLrrAN RESEARcH 28, supra note 7.
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unconstitutional, as a barrier to interstate commerce, by the United
States Supreme Court in 1941.12 Such direct effects as this, however,
are not typical of the effects of the law upon population distribution
in more recent years.
Laws providing and regulating rights to welfare assistance have
traditionally been designed to operate with a pervasive effect upon the
life style and activities of the recipients involved. Welfare statutes
drafted to limit the maximum amounts of welfare aid that any one
family may receive, for example, have been found constitutionally per-
missible, regardless of other qualifications for increased assistance.' 3
Statutes more directly affecting population migration, however, such
as those requiring a period of residency prior to qualification for bene-
fits, have been determined invalid. In so deciding, the United States
Supreme Court, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 4 expressly considered the ef-
fect of such provisions upon population migration:
An indigent who desires to migrate . . . . find a new job and start
a new life will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk mak-
ing the move without the possibility of falling back upon state wel-
fare assistance during his first year of residence when his need
may be most acute. . . . More fundamentally, a State may no
more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare
benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. 15
The operation of the traditional property tax has also affected
population distribution. Generally speaking, property taxation tends
to be heaviest in the central city and lighter in the suburbs, being light-
est in the well-to-do suburbs of medium age. 16 This factor alone would
tend to influence individuals in the central city to migrate to the sub-
urbs. 17 Moreover, property taxation generally penalizes vertical growth
such as is required by the congestion in the central city, and subsidizes
the horizontal expansion which is typical of suburbs.'" The most fa-
vorable property tax result (for the levying jurisdiction) is a net reve-
nue gain, where gross revenue produced by the tax is greater than the
12. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941).
13. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See Note, Legal Analysis
and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1856 (1971).
14. 394 U.S. 618 (1968). See also Gaddis v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 717-24
(N.D.N.Y. 1969); Harvith, Poverty and the Law, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 517 (1970).
15. 394 U.S. at 629, 631.
16. J. PICKARD, TAXATION AND LAND USE IN METROPOLITAN AND URBAN AMERICA
11 (Urban Land Institute Monograph No. 12, 1966).
17. W. BAMAN, THE PROPERTY TAX AND THE SPATIAL PATTERNS OF GRowTH
WITHIN URBAN AREAS 47 (Urban Land Institute Monograph # 16, 1969).
18. PIcKARD, supra note 16, at 9.
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governmental cost attributable to the property taxed. This tax result
is produced by property taxation of vacant land, industrial areas, shop-
ping centers, and high rise apartment buildings. A net revenue loss,
on the other hand, is likely to be produced from property taxation of
single family residents or like areas. 19 That these relations are de-
scribed as "gains" and "losses," however, indicates that the taxes and
burdens are not imposed upon the lands in proportion to services de-
manded, but rather operate to subsidize suburban areas at the expense
of the more highly developed areas in the city. Accordingly, property
taxation tends to heavily subsidize the development of horizontal ex-
pansion while penalizing the vertical growth typical of city cores. Prop-
erty taxes, especially those on residential property, may also be em-
pirically demonstrated to have operated regressively in terms of income
classes. 20  In addition, property tax is one of the most important de-
terminants of residential growth; there is a negative relation between
the effective property tax rate and growth in local areas.21  Despite
its potential for beneficial regulation, however, the overall effect of
the property tax has been to contribute instead to a deviation from op-
timal land use patterns. This is especially true in those outer portions
of urban areas where the property tax encourages fiscal zoning for
industrial enclaves and low density residences. 22
In spite of these important effects, however, property tax is not
nearly so influential upon population distribution as is the federal in-
come tax.23  The federal income tax strongly encourages home owner-
ship in the suburbs over apartment renting or other urban living ac-
commodations. Real property taxes are deductible from the income
to be taxed by the federal government; 24 interest on real estate mort-
gages is similarly deductible;25 realized appreciation in value of a resi-
dential dwelling is not under certain circumstances recognized as in-
come; 28 even to the extent that such realized increase in value is recog-
nized as income it is eligible for favorable treatment as capital gains;2 7
19. Note, Toward Optimal Land Use: Property Tax Policy and Land Use
Policy, 55 CALIF. L. R v. 856, 869 (1967).
20. Netzer, The Property Tax and Alternatives in Urban Land Development, 9
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGs OF THE REGIONAL SCMNCE Ass'N 13-14 (1962).
21. See BAMw, supra note 17.
22. Netzer, supra note 20, at 19.
23. PicLm, supra note 16, at 8. See generally Kindahl, Housing and the Fed-
eral Income Tax, 13 NAT'L TAXJ. 376 (1960).
24. INT.REV. CODE of 1954, §164(a)(1).
25. Id. § 163(a).
26. Id. §§ 121, 1034.
27. Id. § 1250(d)(7).
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and the rental value of a building used by its owner for residential
purposes does not constitute income. 28
A final collateral effect of the operation of law upon population
distribution in the past few years has resulted from various programs
of urban development. These programs caused a departure of people
from the development area, with an accompanying change in the local-
ity which had to bear the costs of those forced to relocate. While fed-
eral law has required that persons displaced by programs of urban re-
newal be provided with adequate and safe housing in other locations,29
such provisions have traditionally been high in rhetoric and low in
performance. In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency"°
in which the plaintiffs claimed that Negro and Puerto Rican displacees
of an urban renewal program were not assured relocation, the court
responded with a statement that
[wjhere the relocation standard set by Congress is met for those
who have access to any housing in the community they can afford,
but not for those who, by reason of their race, are denied free
access to housing they can afford and must pay more for what
they can get, the state action affirms the discrimination in the
market. This is not equal protection of the law.31
Hopefully, the displacees of such programs in the future will be treated
in a way more commensurate with traditional principles of American
justice. Nevertheless, the effects of these programs of urban redevelop-
ment upon population distribution have been recognized and will con-
tinue to be significant.
Zoning Laws: The Major Distribution Tool
The effects of the laws just discussed have been described as "col-
lateral" because these laws were designed to affect population distribu-
tion only incidentally, indirectly, or in reaction to other population
trends. Zoning laws, on the other hand, have been enacted, developed,
and implemented over the last half century with the overt purpose of
regulating the distribution and life styles of particular segments of the
population. The entire concept of zoning is exclusionary-certain uses
of land are excluded from certain areas-and the power to negatively
exclude includes the power to positively locate, by designating all areas
except the subject area as exclusive. Because of this power to desig-
28. Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 379 (1934).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-60, 3534 (1970).
30. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
31. Id.at931.
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nate permissible land usage and the widespread use of this power, zon-
ing laws have become the raison d'etre of practical analysis of popula-
tion distribution and its manipulation.
The discriminatory consequences of population distribution were
suddently thrust into the public spotlight as a result of the 1971 Cali-
fornia case of Serrano v. Priest2 which held that the California public
school financing system-typical of such systems around the country
in that it relied upon local property taxes as a financial base for the
school district-was in violation of the equal protection clause of the
constitution. The allotment of a greater amount of money for educa-
tion to the children attending the schools of one district than to those
in another district was common because of the fortuitous mix of resi-
dential and commercial properties in various school districts. More-
over, this fortuitous distribution throughout the state was partially
shaped and greatly hardened by state action in the form of zoning or-
dinances and other governmental land use controls. 38 Serrano repre-
sents a major breakthrough in the war against exclusive zoning prac-
tices.
After the experimentation in various municipalities of the United
States in the early years of this century, zoning became firmly estab-
lished in our social and legal fabric with the United States Supreme
Court case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,34 in 1926. The
Euclid case was brought, as have been nearly all zoning cases, by a
land owner the value of whose property was greatly reduced because
of its classification. The focus of the case, which was won by the
landowner at the district court level, was the degree to which private
property rights should be protected from governmental interference.3 5
32. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
33. Id. at 603-04, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
34. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). This landmark case established the validity of a zon-
ing classification, merging the doctrine of nuisance into the doctrine of police power.
Under the principles of Euclidean zoning higher uses are those uses most greatly in
need of protection from potential obnoxious neighboring activities, and lower uses are
those uses presumably not in such great need of such protection. The highest uses in-
clude inter alia, large single family residential homes on large blocks in "nice" sub-
urbs; lower uses include apartment houses or other multiple family dwellings, commer-
cial shops and activities; and the lowest uses of all are industrial sites. Inasmuch as
the backing required for each of these uses is economically based, population distri-
bution under the system of Euclidean zoning is also dependent largely upon income
level.
35. In the words of District Judge Westenhaver: "My conclusion is that the
ordinance involved, as applied to plaintiff's property, is unconstitutional and void; that
it takes plaintiff's property, if not for private, at least for public, use, without just
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Even at that time, however, there was recognition of the fact that zon-
ing was destined to have a pervasive effect upon population distribu-
tion. The controversy concerning private property rights would con-
tinue as a bone of contention in zoning cases from 1926 to the present,
but so also would considerations of population distribution. In the
words of District Judge Westenhaver, in his decision for the landowner
in the Euclid case:
The plain truth is that the true object of the ordinance in question
is to place all the property in an undeveloped area of 16 square
miles in a strait-jacket. The purpose to be accomplished is really
to regulate the mode of living of persons who may hereafter inhabit
it. In the last analysis, the result to be accomplished is to classify
the population and segregate them according to their income or
situation in life. The true reason why some persons live in a man-
sion and others in a shack, why some live in a single-family dwelling
and others in a double-family dwelling, why some live in a two-
family dwelling and others in an apartment, or why some live in a
well-kept apartment and others in a tenement, is primarily eco-
nomic.3 6
With the ultimate decision sustaining zoning, the stage was set.
In the years to follow, the arguments that zoning regulations deprive
individual citizens of private property without compensation, and in-
duce a maldistribution of population, were heard again and again, but
compensation; that it is in no just sense a reasonable or legitimate exercise of police
power .... . Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 317 (N.D. Ohio
1924).
36. Id. at 316. One can only speculate as to why these arguments were un-
availing before the United States Supreme Court. According to one commentator,
"Justice Sutherland . . . was writing an opinion for the majority in Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co., holding the zoning ordinance unconstitutional, when talks with
his dissenting brethren (principally Stone, I believe) shook his convictions and led
him to request a reargument, after which he changed his mind and the ordinance was
upheld." McCormack, A Law Clerk's Recollections, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 712
(1946). Justice Sutherland's opinion in the case, ultimately upholding the ordinance,
did not include discussion of the merits of the legislation, but was rather merely an
illustration of a view of law under which such legislation could withstand attacks on its
constitutionality: "Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied
to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even a half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day,
for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which before the ad-
vent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as
fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while
the meaning of constitutional guarantees never varies, the scope of their application
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly
coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that
it should be otherwise." 272 U.S. at 387.
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fell in nearly all cases upon deaf (or, at least, minority) ears. r Zoning
classification is a form of discrimination by definition, but throughout
the intervening years since the Euclid case, until very recently, the
whims of the community government as reflected in zoning practices
have been subject to very few restrictions in the form of judicial re-
view, as a brief survey of some typical cases will quickly reveal.
Zoning ordinances prescribing minimum sizes of homes in areas of
differing zoning classifications 38 and changing a single family residen-
tial beach property to a classification which permitted apartment and
hotel uses have been upheld after being subjected to only restrained
judicial review.3 9  Moreover, an ordinance prohibiting the erection of
multiple family dwellings within the municipality has been sustained"
on the ground that "it cannot be said that every municipality must
provide for every use somewhere within its borders."41  Another court
has upheld minimum lot and floor space requirements in a predom-
inantly rural community to prevent future overcrowding.42 Similarly,
height and density limits for apartment houses have been upheld as
reasonably calculated to prevent overcrowding, traffic congestion, and
37. See 1 R. ANDERSON, AmCAN LAW OF ZONING § 2.22, at 93-100 (1968).
38. Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693
(1952).
39. City of Miami Beach v. Lackman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1954), appeal dis-
inissed, 348 U.S. 906 (1955).
40. Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrook Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
41. Id. at 325, 139 A.2d at 752. That statement demonstrates the lack of sen-
sitivity to the problem of population maldistribution, as a result of zoning ordinances
which is typical of traditional zoning cases. The contrary view was maintained through-
out the years, but nearly always as a minority position. The contrary argument was
beautifully stated in Vickers v. Township Comm. of Glouster, (in a dissent, of course)
by Justice Hall: "In my opinion legitimate use of the zoning power by such munici-
palities does not encompass the right to erect barricades on their boundaries through
exclusion or too tight restriction of uses where the real purpose is to prevent feared
disruption with a so-called chosen way of life. Nor does it encompass provisions de-
signed to let in as new residents only certain kinds of people, (footnote omitted) or
those who can afford to live in favored kinds of housing, or to keep down tax bills of
present property owners. When one of the above is the true situation deeper consid-
erations intrinsic in a free society gain the ascendancy and courts must not be hesitant to
strike down purely selfish and undemocratic enactments. . . . It seems contradictory
to sustain so readily legislative policy at the state level forbidding various kinds of dis-
crimination in housing ... and permitting the use of eminent domain and public
funds to remove slums and provide decent living accommodations. . . and at the same
time bless selfish zoning regulations which tend to have the effect of precluding people
who now live in congested and undesirable city areas from obtaining housing within
their means in open, attractive and healthy communities." 37 N.J. 232, 264, 181
A.2d 129, 147 (1962).
42. Town of Lebanon v. Woods, 153 Conn. 182, 215 A.2d 112 (1965).
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the destruction of the character of adjacent single family residential
areas.43
In two recent cases,44 the courts have upheld zoning ordinances
for aesthetics and environmental protection, even though the operation
of these ordinances precluded plaintiffs, on economic grounds, from
constructing low cost housing projects. The ordinances were found to
be on their face not expressly in service of discrimination on racial,
ethnic, or economic grounds. At the same time, however, zoning ordi-
nances which exempt public housing projects have also been upheld on
the basis that it is in the public interest to make allowances for public
housing.4"
There can be no real question concerning the validity of legal
and technical arguments used to sustain zoning ordinances. The ques-
tion is rather whether competing values must also be considered. So
long as the effects of zoning activities upon private property rights and
upon population maldistribution are largely ignored by the courts, suf-
ficient justifications to support zoning enactments will be found. Re-
cent cases indicate, however, that the presumption in favor of validity
is not as strong as it once was.
New Trends in Zoning Litigation
The 1950's, that decade when governmental reform groups
sprang up to fill the social void created by the passing of war, served
naturally as a time during which the conflicting views of zoning could
be spotlighted. On the one hand, this decade was probably the high
water mark in zoning activity and public approval of and reliance upon
43. Watson v. Mayflower Property, Inc., 223 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969).
44. Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Organizations v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan
Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
45. Cameron v. Zoning Agent of Bellingham, 357 Mass. -, 260 N.E.2d 143
(1970). Forms of low cost housing frequently prohibited or regulated out of exist-
ence by zoning ordinances are mobile homes or mobile home parks. Generally
speaking, courts have held that mobile home parks may be restricted under some
circumstances bearing a reasonable relationship to zoning purposes. Town of Man-
chester v. Phillips, 243 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962). In Vickers v. Township
Comm. of Glouster, 37 N..J 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), there was an action challeng-
ing the validity of zoning ordinances which effectively precluded trailer parks entirely
from the township. In holding in favor of the ordinance, the court relied upon the
traditional doctrine that a municipality does not have to provide for every use within
its boundaries, and that it was not unreasonable for the township to consider problems
of aesthetics and congestion presumably caused by trailer camps.
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zoning operations; it was also during this period, however, that a new
trend in zoning litigation developed, including an increased awareness
of the problems generated by zoning. In accordance with the temper
of the times, the private property argument was but moderately success-
ful, but the argument concerning population maldistribution and un-
fairness began to fall upon increasingly receptive ears.
The progress in this regard has not been spectacular until very
recently but has its roots during that early decade. In Gust v. Town-
ship of Canton,40 for example, a zoning ordinance prohibiting a mobile
home park's operation anywhere within the boundaries of the township
was held invalid on the basis that it bore no substantial relationship to
the traditional police power considerations of the public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare. The court found that
[t]he test of validity is not whether the prohibition may at some
time in the future bear a real and substantial relationship to the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare, but whether it
does so now.47
Another area of land use activity which is frequently the subject
of litigation is the operation of apartments or other multiple family
dwellings. Zoning laws have traditionally operated to severely restrict
these uses of land; recent litigation, however, has attacked these zoning
ordinances. Typical of this trend is the Girsh Appeal,8 a case in which
the subject zoning plan contained no provisions at all for apartment
use districts. The court ruled that the township's failure to provide
for apartments in the zoning plans was unconstitutional: "In refusing
to allow apartment development as part of its zoning scheme, appellee
has in effect decided to zone out the people who would be able to live
in the township if apartments were available. '49
Increasingly, this discriminatory aspect of zoning operation is be-
ing recognized by the courts, not only in cases involving mobile home
parks and apartment buildings but also in cases involving ordinary
single family use restrictions. In Molino v. Mayor and Council of the
Borough of Glassboro"0 the holding of the court seems to estab-
lish a right to be free of economic discrimination. Plaintiffs contended
that the subject zoning ordinance, requiring that 70 percent of the
46. 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955).
47. Id. at 439, 70 N.W.2d 774-75.
48. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). Contra, Fanale v. Borough of Hasbrook
Heights, 26 N.J. 320, 139 A.2d 749 (1958).
49. 437 Pa. at 242, 263 A.2d at 397.
50. 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971).
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apartments contain no more than one bedroom, was specifically de-
signed to keep children out of the borough in order to prevent an in-
crease in the school tax burden. The court, finding that this require-
ment precluded occupancy by moderate and low income families, de-
cided that there exists a right to live as a family unit and held that the
zoning power could not be used in this way to limit family size. 5'
Another frequent purpose of zoning is to provide limitations re-
stricting group or communal living, an increasingly popular mode of
residential living which consists of unrelated persons occupying a single
residence.52  In Kirsh Holding Company v. Borough of Manasquan53
the admitted purpose of the zoning ordinance was to control or prohibit
"obnoxious" behavior by eliminating group rentals of summer cottages
to college students. The court struck down that zoning provision as
unreasonable and arbitrary, finding that "zoning ordinances are not
intended and cannot be expected to cure or prevent most anti-social
conduct. . . ."'I The court went on to say that control of activities
such as these must be rooted in appropriate police power ordinances.15
The Future of Zoning
It appears that the next big battle in the enforcement of civil
rights within the United States will center around the need for changes
51. Id. at 203-04, 281 A.2d at 405. A similar approach was taken in National
Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d
597 (1965). In this case the township was in the path of population expansion and
30 percent of the township area was included in a zoning classification requiring four
acre residential lots. While recognizing the power of municipalities to enact zoning
regulations, the court noted that "at some point along the spectrum, however, the size
of the lots ceases to be a concern requiring public regulation and becomes simply a
matter of private preference." Id. at 524, 215 A.2d at 608. That this private prefer-
ence could not serve as a basis for economic discrimination was made clear: "A zoning
ordinance whose primary purpose is to prevent the entrance of newcomers in order to
avoid future burdens, economic and otherwise, upon administration of public services
and facilities, cannot be held valid. . . . It is clear, however, that the general welfare
is not fostered or promoted by a zoning ordinance designed to be exclusive and exclu-
sionary." Id. at 532-33, 215 A.2d at 612.
52. See Comment, Excluding the Commune from Suburbia: The Use of Zoning,
for Social Control, 23 HASTINGS L.J. -(1972).
53. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971).
54. Id. at 243, 281 A.2d at 520.
55. Not all attacks upon zoning are successful, however, even at this late date.
In the 1970 case of Palo Alto Tenants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal.
1970), the plaintiffs argued that as members of a communal living group their right to
freedom of association was violated and their life style was harrassed by enforcement
of a city zoning ordinance prohibiting more than eight unrelated persons from occupy-
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in restrictive zoning laws and their untoward collateral effects on pop-
ulation distribution. The most recent situation to create additional
controversy in this regard is the need for the busing of school children.
Any action of the United States Congress forbidding or restricting
the use of busing for school integration will increase the internal pres-
sure in large metropolitan areas to break through the zoning barricade
that walls city dwellers from the suburbs. In the view of some city
planners, the separation of city ghettos from the leafy suburbs is main-
tained primarily through the institution of zoning. Ordinances which
make it impossible for city dwellers of medium or low income to buy
homes out in the country near the migrating city factories must be re-
pealed if the pattern is to change.56
Increasing federal court tests may also be expected. An example
is the current court test involving Ford Motor Company's purchase of
200 acres in Mahwah, New Jersey, a town of 10,500, for the relocation
of its Newark facility employing 4200 workers. The workers found
exclusionary zoning ordinances in Mahwah requiring them to buy lots
of half acre or more, which, of course, only a few could afford.57 An-
other well known current test case involves the area known as Black
Jack, Missouri, 58 in which the federal government has actively inter-
vened. Late in 1969, in reaction to rumors that Black Jack was sched-
uled to be the site of a federally assisted, low income, racially integrated
housing project, area citizens obtained permission from the St. Louis
County Council to incorporate Black Jack as a fourth class city with
zoning authority. Immediately thereafter, Black Jack's newly created
zoning board passed an ordinance banning all multiple family housing,
including the proposed project. In reaction to the zoning ordinance,
the Justice Department has brought suit against Black Jack, charging
that the zoning action against the proposed housing project deprived
prospective residents of their right to fair housing under Title VIII
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Here, it appears, is the harbinger.
ing a dwelling. The court rejected their contention, recognizing that there exists a
valid distinction between a legally recognized biological family and an unrelated "fam-
ily group." The court cited factors justifying density zoning, such as noise, traffic
problems, and parking congestion, in support of its view.
56. A recent move to open the suburbs is Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff's bill
forbidding federal installations to move to suburbs which have refused to provide land
for housing for workers. Strout, Rights Battle is Joined on Issue of Suburban Zoning
Des Moines Sunday Register, Nov. 14, 1971, at 7-A.
57. See generally NLWsWnEK, Nov. 15, 1971, at 61, 69.
58. Id.
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Planned Unit Developments
In reaction to the increasing incidence and success of these at-
tacks upon traditional zoning activities and in accordance with devel-
oping social trends, governmental advisors have shown an interest in
the emerging concept of planned unit developments. Planned unit de-
velopment zoning-involving "cluster zoning" techniques-should fill
the need for properly designed communities from the standpoint of im-
proved population distribution. These developments permit greater
density in parts of the development in return for more open space.
Generally speaking, courts have upheld requirements aimed at support
of such developments and at improvement of the quality of life therein.
The advantage of these developments lies in the economy of scale which
can be achieved. This reduces the price per unit and thereby makes
this form of housing available to a larger group of individuals, while
maintaining sufficient open space for suburban living.
In one case testing the validity of cluster zoning, a zoning ordi-
nance permitted a reduced block size in a subdivision in the event that
appropriate land for parks, schools, etc., was dedicated. A New Jer-
sey court held in Chrinko v. South Brunswick Planning Board59 that
"such an ordinance reasonably advances the legislative purpose of se-
curing open spaces, preventing overcrowding and undue concentration
of population, and promoting the general welfare." Similarly, in Che-
ney v. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. 60 the Pennsylvania court upheld a
change in zoning which allowed planned unit development in an area
previously limited to low density developments, on the grounds of the
recognized ineffectiveness of traditional zoning procedures. The court
pointed out that the traditional approach to zoning laws operated rea-
sonably well so long as residential development took place on a lot-by-
lot basis, but that the increasing popularity of large residential develop-
ments made it apparent that land could be more efficiently used and
more aesthetically planned if zoning requirements were focused on the
entire development rather than upon an individual lot."
The Development of "New Towns"
Under Federal Legislation
The ultimate in planned unit development is the creation of entire
new towns where no population concentration previously existed. Be-
59. 77 N.J. Super. 594, 187 A.2d 221 (1963).
60. 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
61. Id. at 630-31, 241 A.2d at 83.
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cause of the difficulties involved in an undertaking of such massive
scope, new town development has been encouraged by federal legisla-
tion.
On August 1, [1968] in the plaza of the new building of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development [in Washington,
D.C.], President Lyndon B. Johnson put his signature on the Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act of 1968. . . . In his address,
the President said: "Today, we are going to put on the books of
American law what I genuinely believe is the most farsighted, the
most comprehensive, the most massive housing program in all
American history." 62
New Communities Act of 1968-Guarantee Provisions
Title IV of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968
contains guarantees for financing new community land development.
Called the New Communities Act of 1968,68 this title is designed to
further the development of "new towns" in the United States. Hope-
fully, an examination of the act and subsequent actions under its au-
thorization will enable us to determine the degree to which its provi-
sions will be of actual practical value to the prospective new towns
builder in the tradition of Columbia, Maryland, and Reston, Virginia.
The general purpose of the act is to facilitate "the enlistment of private
capital in new community development, to encourage the development
of new communities. . '." Some specific goals of the new com-
munities are to be: provision of additions to the general housing sup-
ply, 5 the spurring of innovations in housing,66 increasing the range
of housing choice,67 encouraging a "diversified local home building
industry,"6 8 and inducing, for reasons of economy, "new and improved
technology" in construction. 9 The encouragement of small builders
is reiterated specifically in section 3908.
The proposed "enlistment of private capital" is to be accomplished
via federal guarantees of "the bonds, debentures, notes, and other obli-
62. National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, NA-RO Let-
ter, Aug. 9, 1969. The act has been updated but not essentially changed by the
Urban Growth and New Community Development Act of 1970, Title VII of the Hous-
ing and Urban Development Act of 1970.
63. 42U.S..C §§ 3901-14 (1970).
64. Id. § 3901.
65. Id. § 3901(3).
66. Id. § 3901(4).
67. Id. § 3901(5).
68. Id. § 3901(6).
69. Id. § 3901(7).
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gations issued by new community developers to help finance new com-
munity development projects. ' 70 The large initial investment, extended
time before commencement of return, and irregular pattern of cash
returns, are all specifically recognized as problems to be overcome by
the developer;71 these problems will presumably be lessened by the
proposed federal guarantees. Mere guarantees do not require federal
expenditure, but some federal liability incurred as a result of defaults
on guaranteed notes must be foreseen. This liability is to be met from
a fund composed of receipts from fees and charges, receipts from se-
curity and subrogation rights, and subsequent authorizations and appro-
priations. 72 In addition, in the event that this fund should prove insuf-
ficient, the issuance of federal debentures toward payment of guarantee
is impliedly authorized. 73  The program is intended to be self-support-
ing,7 4 however, and total guaranteed principal cannot exceed $500,-
000,000.11 Additionally, the total guaranteed principal with respect
to a single new community cannot exceed the sum of $50,000,000.76
Eligibility for the federal guarantee involves acceptance of the
lender, the developer, the obligation to be guaranteed, and the devel-
opment itself, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
or its designees. 77 The eligibility of the new community development
itself is spelled out in detail. In addition to the general feasibility
requirements, 8 the development plan must be consistent with an area
70. See id. § 3902.
71. See H.R. No. 1585, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 2 U.S.C. CONG.
& ADM N. NEWS 2873 (1968).
72. 42U.S.C. § 3906(a) (1970).
73. See id. § 3906(b).
74. Id § 3905.
75. Id. § 3906(d).
76. Id. § 3904(b).
77. Authority to approve the lender is delegated with full discretion to the sec-
retary of the department (the secretary). See 42 U.S.C. § 3904(a)(2) (1970). The
discretion of the secretary in regard to approval of the developer is similar and is lim-
ited only in that the developer cannot be a public body. Id. § 3904(a)(1). The
guaranteed note, itself, is a bit more restricted; the primary limitation involves the
percentage of the principal which may be represented by the note. Id. § 3904(a) (4).
The amount of the note must not exceed 80 percent of the secretary's estimate of
the value of the property after completion of the development, or the sum of 75 per-
cent of the secretary's estimate of the value of the property before development plus
90 percent of his estimate of the cost of development, whichever is less. Id. Other
limitations on the note, such as interest rate, id. § 3904(a) (5), maturity provisions,
id. § 3904(a)(6), and security interests, id. § 3904(a)(7), are mentioned, but spe-
cific requirements are again vested in the discretion of the secretary.
78. Id. § 3903(1)-(2).
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"comprehensive plan ' 7r and must "include a proper balance of hous-
ing for families of low and moderate income."80 Moreover, no guar-
antee or commitment to guarantee may be made until the development
plan "has received all governmental approvals required by State or lo-
cal law or by the Secretary." ' -1 This requirement will be discussed in
some detail in a later section.
New Communities Act of 1968-Supplementary Grants
In addition to the guarantee provisions of the act, there is provided
a program of supplementary grants. Like the guarantee program, an
emphasis here is upon "housing units for low and moderate income
persons" which must "be made available. 8 2 Unlike the guarantee pro-
gram, however, this system of supplementary grants is available (and
limited to "[sltate and local public bodies and agencies carrying out
new community assistance projects. '8 3  Grants under this setup are
limited to 20 percent of the total cost of the assistance project; 4 this
is different from the cost of the entire development. In addition,
total federal contributions from all sources may not exceed 80 per-
cent.85 A primary financial limitation exists, of course, in the sum of
money available for the program. The act authorizes appropriations
not to exceed $5,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and
not to exceed $25,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970.86
A final consideration which is determinative of the value of these
programs is the use to which the available money may be put. The
money provided under the New Communities Act must be used "to
finance a program of land development . . . [and] all proceeds . . .
[must be] expended pursuant to such a program. ' 87  "Land develop-
ment" is defined as
79. Id. § 3903 (4).
80. Id. § 3903(3)(B).
81. Id. § 3903(3)(A). The administration of the program is a function of the
secretary of the department of housing and urban development, and the functions, pow-
ers, and duties to issue rules and regulations are vested in that office. Id. § 3912.
In the exercise of this power, he is also "authorized to establish and collect fees for
guarantees." Id. § 3905. The act further provides that the secretary shall report to
Congress concerning the proposed fees; this report shall be made on or before January
1, 1970. Id.
82. Id. § 3911(a).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. § 3911(b).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 3911(d).
87. Id. § 3904(a)(3).
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the process of grading land, making, installing, or constructing
water lines and water supply installations, sewer lines and sewage
disposal installations, steam, gas, and electric lines and installa-
tions, roads, streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, storm drainage facili-
ties, and other installations or work, whether on or off the site,
which the Secretary deems necessary or desirable to prepare land
for residential, commercial, industrial, or other uses, or to provide
facilities for public or common use. The term "land development"
shall not include any building unless it is (1) a building which is
needed in connection with a water supply or sewage disposal in-
stallation or a steam, gas, or electric line or installation, or (2) a
building, other than a school, which is to be owned and maintained
jointly by the residents of the new community or is to be trans-
ferred to public ownership, but not prior to its completion.88
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965
If the language quoted above sounds familiar, there is good rea-
son. The act discussed above, with these limitations and definitions,
is a direct descendent of title X of the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 196589 and deviates little from the provisions of that
earlier act. A brief examination of the operation of title X may add
to our understanding of title IV.
Title X, the "Mortgage Insurance for Land Development" section
of the 1965 act, provides for federal insurance of first mortgages en-
tered into by land developers for the purpose of financing "improve-
ments."90  The effective operation of that act is the same in scope as
the New Communities Act, and the definition quoted above seems to
have been taken verbatim from the provisions of the earlier legislation.
The 1965 act provides that "the term 'land development' means the
process of making, installing, or constructing improvements," 91 and
"improvements" is defined in the same language that the New Commu-
nities Act uses to define "land development."92  This gross similarity in
language cannot be coincidental.
88. Id. § 3914(a).
89. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1749aa-174911 (1970).
90. Id. § 1749bb.
91. Id. § 1749aa(e).
92. Id. § 1749aa(d) defines "improvements" as "waterlines and water supply in-
stallations, sewerlines and sewage disposal installations, steam, gas, and electric lines
and installations, roads, streets, curbs, gutters, sidewalks, storm drainage facilities, and
other installations or work, whether on or off the site, which the Secretary deems nec-
essary or desirable to prepare land primarily for residential and related uses or to pro-
vide facilities for public or common use. Related uses may include industrial uses,
with sites for such uses to be in proper proportion to the size and scope of the develop-.
ment. The term improvements shall not include any building unless it is (1) a build-
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The eligibility of new community development for assistance under
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 was specifically pro-
vided by a 1966 amendment to that act.93 The standards imposed
upon such developments as a condition of eligibility are also similar to
the standards in the New Communities Act. Both the Housing and
Urban Development Act, in general,94 and the new communities
amendment to the act, in particular,9 5 require, like the New Commu-
nities Act of 1968,96 that the development plans be approved by all
appropriate governmental planning units before assistance is granted.
Evaluation of Federal Legislation
The supplementary grants program of the New Communities Act
presents several interesting questions which are crucial to an evaluation
of the potential helpfulness of the grants. Inasmuch as the provision
of a grant is dependent upon approval of a "guaranteed" project, for
instance, there is the question whether this program, too, shall be lim-
ited to "land development," as defined in section 3914(a). Answer:
probably not, based upon the provisions of section 3914(c), with its
broad definition of "new community assistance projects," but this
answer is not certain. Another question is whether the new commu-
nity development as a whole must be approved for "guarantee" under
the act prior to the allowance of a supplementary grant. The answer
here, based upon the language of the act, is probably "yes." And if so,
this rules out the obviously beneficial use of the grant in the initial
planning stages of the development, inasmuch as the plans must be
somewhat advanced prior to approval under the guarantee provisions.
These and other similar important questions do not seem to have been
clarified either by implementation, litigation, or departmental rules.9 7
At present, however, these questions regarding the efficacy of the
supplemental grant program are moot; there is no money available.
The authorization is there,98 and the appropriation was anticipated, at
ing which is needed in connection with a water supply or sewage disposal installation,
or a steam, gas, or electric line, or installation, or (2) a building, other than a school,
which is to be owned and maintained jointly by the property owners ... " Compare
id. with text accompanying note 88 supra.
93. Id. § 1749cc-l(a).
94. Id. § 1749cc(b) (1).
95. Id. § 1749cc-1(c).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 3903(3) (1970).
97. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.29 (1971).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 3911(a) (1970).
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least in some token amount, in the supplemental appropriations act for
the Department of Housing and Urban Development during the second
session of the 90th Congressf9 Unfortunately, that act contained no
mention of the new communities program. Nor has this oversight been
corrected; no money has yet been appropriated, by either the ninetieth
or ensuing congresses.
Several unanswered questions concerning the guarantee provisions
of the New Communities Act must also be faced. To prevent land
prices from escalating, the developer must possess an interest in the
land prior to presentation of his plan to the local agency. In addition,
because the plan must be approved by the appropriate state and local
governmental bodies before it becomes eligible for the program, the
developer must possess an interest in the land prior to the federal guar-
antee. While the act itself does not specify that any particular land
interest be held by the developer, it is unlikely that the most eco-
nomically feasible method of land reservation-purchase of an option
-would protect the developer throughout the drawn out approval proc-
ess. Any reasonable option would likely expire in too little time. Thus,
the program will likely be of little use to the developer to satisfy his
most crippling need-money for initial acquisition of land.
The primary value of the program, therefore, will be for facilita-
tion of the financing of the utilities and public amenities which must be
constructed after acquisition of the land. Thus emerges the question
whether this program can be utilized in addition to the Land Develop-
ment Act (title X). Such a procedure is likely allowable inasmuch
as the Land Development Act is predicated upon federal insurance of a
"first mortgage," and the New Communities Act does not specify
any such particular collateral except in relation to completed develop-
ment value.10 Nevertheless, the total percentage limitation of federal
contributions to the project' will serve to diminish the value of com-
pounding the two programs if this type of potential liability is consid-
ered a "contribution."' 0 2
The Land Development Act is perhaps of greater value. Of
primary interest are several provisions which affect the value of the act
99. Act of Oct. 4, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-550, tit. II, 82 Stat. 950; see Na-
tional Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, NAHRO Letter, Sept. 6,
1968.
100. 42U.S.C. § 3904(a)(4) (1970).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 3911(b) (1970). See text accompanying note 85 supra.
102. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
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as applied to a program of new community land development, partic-
ularly pertaining to acquisition. The Land Development Act re-
quires that a substantial property interest be vested in the developer; 03
this is to be expected in a "mortgage insurance" program. The reg-
ulations require, however, that the interest be vested at the time the
mortgage is filed, 10 4 and that the application for the federal insurance
be submitted, at the earliest, when the mortgage is "about to be exe-
cuted."'105 Reasonable construction of these two requirements, along
with the requirement for approval of local planning authorities, leads
to the inevitable conclusion that, as a practical matter, the developer
must own the land before submitting an application for the program.
The result is that this program is of no help to a developer who lacks
the gigantic sums required to proceed on his own with the initial land
acquisition.
In summary, the Land Development Act has great potential value
to lenders but is so constructed as to confer no benefit upon the de-
veloper who lacks the backing to obtain the necessary original financing
without the act's assistance. The New Communities Act's guaran-
tee provisions suffer similarly but are of potential value to the developer
in "improving" the tract; again the value accrues only to the developer
who has been able to acquire the land on the strength of his own capital
or credit. The supplementary grants program, whatever its potential
value under yet-to-be-issued regulations, is rendered useless at present
by the absence of congressional appropriation of funds.
These three programs, therefore, despite the promise of their stat-
utory form, are of almost no help to present new town developers.
Hopefully, this situation will improve in the future, but the difficulties
pointed out serve to illustrate that this legislation suffers from apathy
at both the legislative and administrative levels. This indicates that
the real answer to the new town developers' problems must be sought
elsewhere.
Not only has federal legislation been implemented in order to en-
courage the creation of new towns, but state and local governments
have also entered the picture. On the state and local levels, however,
governmental action is not so likely to be manifested in the form of
specific new towns legislation, as in the form of the complex inter-
working of state and local agencies in regulation of and cooperation
103. 24 C.F.RL 1000.42 (1971).
104. 24 C.F.R. 1000.140 (1971).
105. 24 C.F.R. 203.10 (1971).
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with a potential new town developer. This relationship has been dem-
onstrated already in the development of two noted new towns: Co-
lumbia, Maryland, developed by James Rouse, and Reston, Virginia,
developed by Robert E. Simon.
Local Agencies Affecting the Achievement of New Town Zoning
Various local agencies influence the design and development of
new towns throughout the entire planning process. The direct control
of those agencies over the actual design of the project is perhaps most
pervasive in the area of environmental controls, however, because
such direct coercive control over design and construction is the specific
raison d'etre of the zoning agencies in the community. These agencies
must be satisfied before the plans can proceed.
Most states have zoning enabling legislation modeled after the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act' 0 6 The developer, therefore, is
inevitably faced with a triumvirate of boards: the local governing body,
the planning commission and the board of adjustments. The purpose
of the three separate bodies is to separate policy making from policy
application. Policy-making rests with the governing body of the
locality, and administration is given to the planning commission and
the board of adjustment, both nonlegislative administrative agencies.' 17
In theory, the jurisdiction and authority of each of these three bodies
is entirely different. Accordingly, the new town developer is initially
faced with the problem of which body is authorized to approve his
plans.
The board of adjustment is the agency intended to provide a
safety valve from the rigidity of the general zoning ordinance. This
function is to be accomplished through the granting of both variances
and exceptions. "" One writer has suggested that the changes in lot
106. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 594 (1966) [herein-
after cited as MANDELKER].
107. Id. at 761.
108. A variance is an administrative departure from the standards of the zoning
ordinance, justified by the existence of unique and individual hardship imposed by par-
ticular specific circumstances. Such a procedure is required to prevent the rigid applica-
tion of the primary zoning provisions in such a fashion as to constitute a taking of
property without due process of law, and therefore serves to protect the overall zon-
ing law from the charge of unconstitutionality. An exception, on the other hand, is a
use which is allowed in a district in which it would normally be precluded. It is based
upon a determination that the use should be allowed in the district and is made sub-
ject to various limitations and conditions which will assure that no harm results from
the exception. Examples of exceptions are a hospital in a residential district or a fill-
ing station in a light commercial district. Id.
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size and frontage requirements which are involved in new town devel-
opment should be made by the board of adjustment.10 9 However, this
function, when exercised in the scope and context required for new
towns or even for very large subdivision development, is clearly a plan-
ning function, rather than a mere adjustment function,110 and plan-
ning is not within the province of the board of adjustment.'
The planning commission is designed to make the determinations
which form the basis of the policy making activities of the local gov-
erning body. Planning commission advice, based on its intended ex-
pertise, is to be utilized by the governing body not only in regard to
creation of a zoning scheme but also in regard to zoning amend-
ments.' The planning commission, therefore, is usually the agency
which holds the hearings necessary to further planning activity. Never-
theless, the planning commission has no power of its own to directly
change or influence zoning legislation or ordinances, and its advice
need not necessarily be followed by the governing body. Indeed, often
the advice is pointedly ignored as a matter of political spite."'
At least two other serious problems are involved in the normal
process whereby the planning commission holds hearings and then
makes a recommendation to the governing body. The hearing process
in the case of new town development is in reality a series of bargaining
sessions. During these sessions the needs and aspirations of the plan-
ning commission and the developer are compromised and merged into
a plan specifically tailored for the peouliarities of the individual situa-
tion. The developer, in the course of this process, must often make
concessions which would normally render his project unfeasible, but
which he allows because of counterbalancing concessions on the part
of the planning commission. Nevertheless, he may then find that the
governing body, when the final plan is presented for approval upon
the joint recommendation of the developer and the planning commis-
sion, will accept the developer's concessions and reject the commis-
sion's concessions. Even assuming that such action may be in good faith
and in ignorance of the give and take which has already occurred, the
bargaining must begin again, while the developer's costs increase." 4
109. URBAN LAND INSTrruTE, TEcHNIcAL BULL. No. 52, LEGALx ASPECTS OF
PLANNED UNIT RESIDENTLL DEVELoPMENT 38 (1965) [hereinafter cited as T.B. 52].
110. Id.
111. MANDELxER, supra note 106, at 761.
112. T.B. 52, supra note 109, at 38.
113. Lloyd, A Developer Looks at Planned Unit Development, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 3 (1965).
114. Id.
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Another problem of similar nature results from the fragmentation
of local authority. The planning commission may accept deviations
from the norm in the sewer requirements, for instance, upon the basis
of carefully calculated considerations, only to learn at a later date that
the health department refuses to accept the new arrangement. Other
local departments, such as the town engineer, the department of public
works, or the assessor's office, may refuse to accept departures from
road, utility, or setback requirements. These local agencies usually
operate with specific regulatory authority, and the careful planning of
the developer and the planning commission in such cases is all for
naught.115
As has been pointed out, the local governing body must imple-
ment zoning changes in excess of those minor deviations delegated to
the board of adjustment. But even here, the decision may not be final.
The governing body may attempt to delegate this power to the plan-
ning commission through the provision of standards for the commis-
sion's guidance." 6  Such a process has the merit of combining the
hearing and acting functions in the same agency, but it also gives rise
to several problems. It is almost a foregone conclusion that no spe-
cific standards will provide sufficient flexibility to allow accommoda-
tion of new town development;11 to the extent that the standards pro-
vided are general and imprecise, however, the delegation of power may
be unconstitutional."' Even if this delegation is found not subject to
the restrictions of the federal Constitution, as has been argued," 9 many
state constitutions specifically require separation of powers. 2 9 The
effect of these requirements varies, however. In Virginia, the site of
Reston, the constitutional requirement has been held not to require the
imposition of specific predetermined standards;' 2' in Maryland, the still
undecided controversy over this point has developed strong arguments
on both sides.' 22
A further complication in Maryland exists in the form of a re-
quirement that all general laws in nonhome rule counties be passed by
115. Id.
116. T.B. 52, supra note 109, at 33.
117. Craig, Planned Unit Development as Seen from City Hall, 114 U. PA. L.
REv. 127 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Craig].
118. T.B. 52, supra note 109, at 29.
119. Id., at 29 n.103.
120. NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, ADJUSTING MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES (1966).
121. Id., Virginia Section.
122. T.B. 52, supra note 109, at 29-32.
[Vol. 23
the state legislature. Only regulatory ordinances are subject to pas-
sage by the local governing body. Moreover, all zoning changes not
in accordance with predetermined standards, even when executed by
the legislative body, are open to charges of unreasonableness (lack of
substantive due process) and discrimination (lack of equal protection)
under the Constitution.123 Furthermore, statutory limitations may re-
quire conformance with a pre-existing comprehensive zoning plan. 2 4
Robert E. Simon, in developing Reston, Virginia, took full ad-
vantage of the Virginia doctrine allowing delegation of power to the
planning commission. The basic zoning for Reston was provided by
an amendment known as the "Residential Planned Community'" 25
which Simon worked out with the planning commission over a two
year period. 26 The resulting zone for Reston may be viewed as a
prototype of "Residential Planned Community" zoning:
(1) Overall density must be 11 people per acre. Three density
levels are specifically authorized, with the lowest required
density being 3.8 people per acre, and the highest allowed
density being 60 people per acre. The three provided levels
are:
High density: 60 people per acre
Medium density: 14 people per acre
Low density: 3.8 people per acre
(2) No fewer than 100 acres may be developed as a "Planned
Residential Community." A minimum of 14% of the total
acreage must be reserved for governmental or industrial em-
ployers.
(3) A variety of housing types will be permitted, including
high-rise apartments, cluster houses, and individual detached
dwellings.
(4) Lawns and yard spaces may be consolidated into shared
park land and recreational areas. The buildings may be
planned to follow the natural contours of the land. A min-
imum of 100 acres must be set aside as open space.(5) Shopping, commercial, and recreational areas may be diver-
123. Id. at 20-32.
124. Craig, supra note 117, at 128-29.
125. Reston Letter, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 1963, at 1.
126. Id. at 2. The amendment was in part the result of the collaboration of
the well known planning consultant Fred H. Blair, Jr. Hanke, Planned Unit Develop-
ment and Land Use Intensity, 114 U. PA. L. Rnv. 15 (1965). There was no real op-
position because Reston was to be an integral part of pre-existent "Year 2000" plan for
the Washington area, and Simon's own personal power was instrumental in coping
with the fragmentation of authority problem; the County Road Department, County
Water Authority, City of Fairfax, Virginia, Electric and Power Company, (Reston Letter,
Vol. 1, No. 1 Feb. 1963, at 2) and the local sewer authority, (SIMON ENT=RnnSES,
Tr RE TON STORY (1963)) were all integrated into the development.
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sified and spread throughout the area, so as to allow for
such areas convenient to all homes.
(6) The "Master Plan" shall be approved by the governing body.
Then each particular area shall be subject to approval of
its "preliminary plan" by the Planning Commission. Plan-
ning Commission approval of the "final plan" of each area
shall precede the commencement of any actual development.
A standard three-step approval process is thus established.'12 7
James Rouse, in the planning for Columbia, Maryland, faced a
different set of circumstances but solved them in the same way: per-
sonal persuasiveness. The Maryland requirement for state legislative
passage of all general laws of nonhome rule counties required careful
cultivation of the Howard County delegation to the state legislature
(two delegates and one senator) ,128 as well as the members of the
board of county commissioners and the planning commission. 129  The
problems of fragmentation of authority were met, as at Reston, by the
use of the developer's personality, playing upon these facts: all twelve
county departments operated under the jurisdiction of the county com-
missioners; 130 the only county agency not under that jurisdiction oper-
ated subject to the commissioners' approval on all major acts;' 3 ' and
the chairman of the county commission also just happened to be an
influential member of the Howard County School Board and the How-
ard County Planning Commission.' 32
Local Agencies Designed to Further and
Protect New Town Design
Once the traditional zoning scheme has been overcome, the local
government and the developer are faced with a new and paradoxical
127. Woodroof, New Town Planning, 1969 (unpublished paper on file in the
Law Library at Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa).
128. Rouse Co., COLUMBIA, Vol. 1, No. 3, Summer 1966 [hereinafter cited as
COLUMBIA, No. 3].
129. Rouse Co., COLUMBIA, Vol. 1, No. 2, Spring 1966 [hereinafter cited as Co-
LUMBIA No. 2]. The county commissioners were elected in 1963 upon a platform of
"no more growth for Howard County," Anderson, A Brand New City for Maryland,
HARPER'S, Nov. 1964, at 106 [hereinafter cited as Anderson], but succumbed to Rouse's
vision of the inevitability of growth (COLUMBIA No. 3), attention to detail, charm, and
personal accountability (Anderson). The latter factor, particularly, was of great im-
portance in supporting the enormous personal influence which Rouse was able to exert.
This personal influence led to the passage of a zoning amendment creating a "New
Town District" in August 1965, Rouse Co., COLUMBIA, Vol. 1, No. 1, Winter 1966
[hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA No. 11, with approval of specific plans vested, via stand-
ards, in the Planning Commission (COLUMBIA No. 2).
130. Id.
131. COLUMBIA No. 1.
132. COLUMBIA No. 2.
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problem. The machinery for protection of the old status quo having
been destroyed, replacement machinery for protection of the new status
quo must be designed and implemented. Rarely will the restrictions
imposed upon the developer during the design-approval process be suf-
ficient, standing alone, to control the growth which will follow in the
development area.13  An additional text of regulatory ordinances, pro-
posed by the developer may be required as a part of the project, but
such a procedure may be termed (and condemned as) "contract zon-
ing."134 A more feasible plan involves the use of covenants running
with the land. Such a procedure need involve neither a new indigenous
governmental unit nor the initially approving governmental unit.1 5
This procedure was utilized in Reston, which maintains existence
as a business, not a governmental entity. Normal utilities and gov-
ernmental services are provided by the Fairfax County government,
and the Reston "community centers" function to provide additional
amenities on a private cooperative basis. The restrictive covenants im-
pose upon the residents the jurisdiction of the community center and
of the architectural review board which was designed to preserve the
initial design standards. The county government, once approval for
the project is given, forfeits the normal architectural control; this void
must be filled by the implementation of a review procedure.' 6
Columbia, about twice the size of Reston, 37 was the subject of a
much more ambitious governmental scheme. The initial plan was to
incorporate the city and employ a city manager form of government.
This government was to be called the community improvement dis-
trict and was to be financed through a combination of ad valorem taxes
and user charges for services. This setup was integral to the develop-
er's approach to the county commission, which emphasized that Colum-
bia would not seek its anticipated services at the tax expense of the re-
mainder of Howard County. 38  But the plan, involving a change in
the general laws of the county, was subject to approval by the state
legislature under the previously mentioned Maryland nonhome rule
133. Craig, supra note 117, at 129.
134. T.B. 52, supra note 109, at 39.
135. Id.
136. Salonick, Reston: Newest and Finest Research, Industrial Property Guide,
Reston Supplement, VEPCO, Richmond, Virginia.
137. McCue, The Planned Community, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 19, 1967
(pictures), at 2-6.
138. COMMUNiTY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., COLUMBIA: A NEW TOWN
FOR HOWARD COuNTY, Nov. 12, 1964 [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA, A NEw TOWN].
May 19721 1455
county authority provisions, 139 and achieving a city charter has, thus
far, presented an insurmountable problem. 140  Governmental services,
therefore, have continued at the county level. But a private govern-
ment, the Columbia Association, patterned after earlier cooperative
efforts and to a lesser degree after the Reston scheme, was created to
provide amenities. This association obtained taxing power by cove-
nant, and is composed of one elected representative for each 4,000
families.' 4 ' Its manager functions as a city manager. 4 2
As in Reston, architectural purity was protected by the formation
of an architectural review board. 1 43  Other agencies, such as the Co-
lumbia Horse Center, 4  the Johns Hopkins Columbia Medical Facil-
ity,'4 5 the Columbia Cooperative Ministry, 46 and the Religious Facili-
ties Corporation,4 7 were formed to provide certain specialized services
integral to the planned life style. Still other agencies are involved on
a consulting basis. 1
48
An additional consideration is important in connection with the
entire process of establishing the environmental controls in Columbia
and Reston. The human element was prominent, perhaps even para-
mount. In seeking to overcome the rigidities of the traditional zoning
scheme, which office was approached (be it the board of adjustment,
the planning commission, or the board of county commissioners) was
less important than who was approached. The real basis for the zoning
change which was finally achieved was the good will of the individ-
uals in each case-Rouse at Columbia and Simon at Reston.149 More-
over, the dramatic governmental structures which were constructed
for the democratic and static control of the growth anticipated in the
new towns were so designed that the developers maintained tight con-
139. Id.
140. Rapkin, New Towns for America: From Picture to Process, J. FIN., May
1967, at 208-19.
141. COLUMBIA, A NEW TOWN, supra note 139, at -.
142. COLUMBIA No. 2.
143. COLUMBIA No. 3.
144. COLUMBIA No. 2.
145. COLUMBIA No. 3.
146. Id.
147. COLUMBIA No. 1.
148. Examples are the Washington Symphony, The Maryland State Roads Com-
mission, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, Howard County Ag-
ricultural Stablization Commitee, id., and the United States and Professional Golf As-
sociations. COLUMBIA No. 2.
149. Anderson, supra note 130, at 106.
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trol over their projects, despite the formal arrangements for indigenous
representation.1 50
In summary, therefore, the development of new towns does not
differ from other of man's endeavors; the formal structure of the power
relationships becomes subordinate in practice to the operation of the
men behind the system. This personal factor can hardly be over-
rated. Perhaps this is why it has been suggested that the real objective
reaction to the effect of the efforts of Simon and Rduse will occur no
sooner than ten years after the towns are built.' 51 Only at that time
will the new towns emerge from under the protective guiding wings of
their developers. Only then will it be possible to evaluate the degree
to which these towns have been able to preserve an amiable environ-
ment and succeed where our present cities have failed so miserably.
Conclusion
Upon the basis of the considerations discussed in the above para-
graphs, it seems likely that the creation of new towns may have far-
reaching promise as a potential solution to some of the long run prob-
lems of population maldistribution. This combination of legal tech-
niques has a great intrinsic advantage in that both the quantitative and
qualitative aspects of maldistribution are affected, and each is subject
to individual consideration and manipulation. At the same time, how-
ever, it would appear that the very complexity of the required legal
framework, comprehensiveness of preplanning activity, and enormity
of financial investment, which serve to make the creation of new towns
so valuable, prevent the hasty implementation of these legal and social
tools. For this reason it is unrealistic to expect any great short run
relief from these sources.
Approximately the same assessment, somewhat mitigated in
terms of obstacles and in terms of effects, is properly applicable to
planned unit developments. Increasingly, such developments are being
undertaken by practical land developers, and increasingly their products
will become a pervasive force in the American housing market. Even
though such projects are more quickly undertaken and completed than
new towns, however, they not only provide much less housing than
new towns, but also serve to primarily affect only the qualitative aspect
of population maldistribution. The increased short run feasibility of
150. COLUMBIA No. 1.
151. Anderson, supra note 130, at 106.
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such projects, therefore, is offset by a lessened short run effect. The
total result, of course, is cumulative and therefore potentially significant,
but like the new towns approach, only in the long run.
The real immediate hope, then, for improvement in the legal
framework as it relates to the generation and continuance of popula-
tion maldistribution, is likely to rest in overcoming the traditional zoning
laws and their effects' 52 through the utilization of the techniques pre-
viously discussed. Reform of the zoning laws is not only an absolute
necessity in order to achieve long run improvement in the social prob-
lems resulting from population maldistribution but would appear to be
the only hope for beneficial short run results while the larger war on
this injustice continues.
152. See generally R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1966); J. JACOBS, THE
DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES (1961).
